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Abstract—Clear and consistent assessment of the various 
capabilities of cloud service providers (CSPs) will become an 
essential factor in deciding on which CSPs to use in the future, 
particularly as cloud service provision expands futher into more 
sensitive and regulated areas. This paper describes an approach 
that is useful in this regard. Specifically, we describe a mechanism 
in which context is gathered relating to CSPs; this is inputted to a 
rule-based system and decisions are output about the suitability 
of each CSP, including an analysis of privacy and security risk 
and recommended stipulations to be taken into account when 
negotiating contracts and SLAs.
Keywords—Cloud service provider, provisioning, decision 
support system
1. INTRODUCTION
There are a range of privacy and security concerns related 
to cloud computing. In particular, putting data in the cloud may 
impact privacy rights, obligations and status, and different 
laws may apply depending upon where information resides 
in the cloud. However, there is strong evidence that current 
cloud models do not take into account confidence, trust and 
assurance requirements [1]. Although currently this is often 
overlooked, when considering using a CSP, organizations 
should ask the same questions that they would during a third 
party vendor or business partner security program review, as 
well as some additional cloud-specific questions. 
For example, privacy-related questions that should 
be asked in advance by an organization to CSPs if personal 
information is going to be handled by them might include:
• Who will have access to the organisation’s data?
• Where will this data be processed and stored?
• Will it be encrypted at rest and in transit?
• Will it be intermingled with data from other 
companies?
• Are the backup and recovery processes in place 
adequate for the organisation’s needs?
• What are the availability promises for the cloud 
service? Are they documented within a Service Level 
Agreement (SLA)?
• Will the organisation be able to obtain information 
about data access and associated logs, and how 
quickly will this be?
• What audit trails are generated and maintained for 
the data? Does this include logs about data usage and 
sharing? 
In addition, legal issues such as transborder data flow 
may need to be taken into account. The situation can easily 
become too complex for a human alone to handle, or it might 
be that the human does not have the requisite experience to be 
able to make an informed decision. The latter is particularly 
relevant for companies who do not yet have extensive 
experience with outsourcing. 
In this paper we describe a solution to this issue, in the 
form of a decision support system for cloud provisioning. 
In the following section we provide more details of this 
approach. Section 3 describes how the knowledge base (KB) 
can be built up and used within the system. Section 4 provides 
an example usage case, Section 5 compares this approach with 
related work and Section 6 assesses its current status. Finally, 
conclusions are given.
2. DECISION SUPPORT FOR CLOUD COMPUTING
In this section we provide an overview of our 
approach, details of the system architecture, examine the 
system from the customer and the CSP viewpoints, and 
discuss the key issue of how to deal with the CSP responses 
in a uniform way.
2.1 Overview of our Approach
 Our approach is a decision support tool that 
gathers context relating to cloud service providers 
(CSPs) and inputs to a rule-based system, to 
trigger decisions about whether or not to use that 
CSP and/or additional stipulations that would 
need to be made. The tool helps to determine 
appropriate actions that should be allowed and 
assesses risk before personal information is 
passed on through the cloud. It is semi-automated 
to significantly lower the transaction costs for the 
selection of CSPs for the customer.   















107GSTF INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON COMPUTING, VOL. 1, NO. 1, AUGUST 2010
© 2010 GSTF
 Our solution provides a means in which an 
assessment of the CSP’s practices can be made 
in a semi-automated fashion prior to the decision 
to use that CSP. The solution may also be useful 
for the CSPs themselves when composing other 
CSP’s services to deliver their own services.   
 Our innovation is the usage of a specialised tool 
in order to aid a customer to make decisions 
about whether or not to use a particular CSP and 
optionally also particular clauses that should be 
added into contracts or service level agreements 
(SLAs) between the customer and that CSP. 
When the customer wishes to assess different 
CSPs offering a service, these providers will use 
the tool via a web interface in order to provide 
answers to the questionnaire which they are asked, 
and the results will be sent back to the enterprise 
that wishes to choose between the service 
providers. These results will include reports and 
automatically generated ratings. Potentially, a 
compliance team of the customer firm, regulators 
or other third parties (e.g. auditors) can access a 
view on the DSS system (focusing on its logs and 
generated reports). This is a major step towards 
providing transparency and accountability for 
assessing compliance.  
 Out tool offers a number of advantages over 
currently available solutions. In comparison to 
manual or Excel spreadsheet-based solutions, our 
tool has intelligence integrated into the solution 
so that it can efficiently tailor questionnaires and 
output to particular customer needs. Decision 
tree-based solutions are also not powerful 
enough to model common privacy knowledge 
conveniently as decision tress have difficulty 
in dealing simultaneously with the multiple 
dependencies relevant for privacy decisions (e.g. 
between the countries involved, the type of data 
that need to be handled, business processes etc.) 
On the other hand, general expert systems due 
to their extensive capabilities lack determinism 
and sometimes guarantees for termination. The 
tool we are using is expressive enough to express 
common privacy knowledge for cloud services, 
while restricted enough to have provable 
determinism and termination. We achieve this 
by using a rule-based system in a controlled 
way.  The basic tool has been built and its KB 
has been successfully populated with the privacy 
knowledge of the 300 page rule-book of a global 
corporation.      
2.2 System Architecture
 There are various ways in which such a decision 
support tool might be deployed in cloud 
environments. One example that provides trust 
for the customer would be if the customer hosts 
the Cloud Decision Support System (DSS), and 
optionally even by the DSS being provided 
as a service within a private, hybrid or public 
cloud that is controlled by the customer. More 
generally, a cloud-based CSP assessment service 
could be offered to a number of enterprises, as 
shown in Figure 1. For each customer enterprise, 
an administrator will set up the original 
questionnaire according to the policies that the 
customer (i.e. the enterprise) wishes to check, 
or else the enterprise may just use a default 
setting offered by the assessment service. When 
the customer (typically, an enterprise) wishes to 
assess different CSPs offering a service, these 
providers (CSP1 and CSP2 in Figure 1) will use 
the tool via a web interface in order to provide 
answers to the questionnaire which they are 
asked, and the results will be sent back to the 
enterprise that wishes to choose between the 
service providers. These results will include 
reports and automatically generated ratings (to 
allow the administrator to easily distinguish 
between the competitors). 
 They are generated by means of an inference 
engine that contains rules which are triggered by 
parameters (set from the answers to the questions 
or set by other rules) and that output new 
parameter settings, refine metrics that are used 
for the ratings and/or information to be contained 
within the report. 
Fig. 1. High-level architecture.
 The particular inputs, settings, reports and values 
associated with each assessment are stored 
within the database (DB). An authorised entity 
may review and also update the knowledge base 
(KB) if desired, via a management interface and 
management handler. 
 The mechanism by which inputs from the service 
provider side are compared with the requirements 
of the customer may vary. For example, the CSPs 
may publish policies and the DSS can use this 
input within the tool, without the need to engage 
the CSPs in any interactions with the DSS. 
Alternatively, as shown in Figure 1 for example, 
the CSPs might engage with the DSS directly in 
order that the DSS can produce output from this 
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1 illustrates the case where a CSP might host 
the DSS as part of a cloud service available for 
multiple customers; alternatively, as mentioned 
above, an individual customer might host the 
DSS.
2.3 The Customer Experience
 The customer’s task is to provide the context that 
determines the requirements for the cloud service 
provision. The customer user interface (UI) 
asks the customer for information that allows 
generation of a questionnaire that will be shown 
to the CSP and provides the context in which the 
CSP’s answers can be rated for their adequacy to 
the customer’s needs. 
 The customer UI assesses 
• the type of data that will be processed (e.g. 
whether there is any sensitive data involved),
• for which business process the outsourcing is 
to occur
• the country of origin of the data subjects
• any restrictions the customer might have for 
countries where the data will be processed or 
stored
• which level of access to the data are required 
• certain security standards and security 
certifications and audit procedures the 
customer wishes to see 
• whether end users need to be in direct contact 
with the service provider and who contacts 
whom over which medium. 
 Some of these questions – such as for data 
types, the business process used etc – are made 
mandatory, whereas others such as certifications 
and security standards are optional (in cases 
where the customer does not yet have strict 
assurance requirements in place). We also allow 
the customer company to mark certain answers 
as ‘always applicable’ for that corporation, for 
instance because they reflect company policies. 
Thus, when the customer works on different 
outsourcing projects, the company profile is 
always pre-populated with these answers. This 
is beneficial by ensuring that certain minimum 
standards are followed with all cloud vendors 
with whom a customer might be dealing.  
 In addition, the customer UI allows for certain 
free text entries about the customer expectations 
to express requirements that can not yet be 
expressed with the pre-populated choices. This 
information will be displayed to the CSP who can 
respond with free text. However this information 
cannot yet be used for the automated reasoning 
in the tool and should thus only be used where 
necessary.  
2.4 The Cloud Service Provider Experience
 As mentioned in Section 2.2, there are various 
alternative mechanisms for providing the 
information about what the CSP will do: using 
the DSS directly with the customer, or else using 
the tool to produce output that is then accessible 
publicly, e.g, via a website which contains the 
CSP’s answers to common question the DSS 
would ask. These CSP policies can then be 
taken as input by the DSS in order to make an 
evaluation for the current organisation’s context. 
The motivation for CSPs to provide input for 
the tool is market forces – otherwise, only the 
‘lowest’ default policy within the system would 
be allocated to their offering.
 We focus on the solution where a DSS is used. 
In this case a questionnaire will be presented 
to an administrator acting on behalf of the CSP 
asking them in clear natural language (with drop-
down choices where possible rather than free 
text options) information that is relevant to be 
able to assess the security and trustworthiness 
of their service.  In addition relevant customer 
requirements are explicitly displayed to the 
CSP admin so he can clearly understand what 
the minimal requirements of the customer are. 
Based on this information the CSP will be asked 
questions such as the location of the servers to be 
used, access control mechanisms used, encryption 
mechanisms used, purposes for which data will 
be used, whether there is further outsourcing/
sharing of information with other organizations, 
and the mechanisms in place that the CSP has for 
enforcing the organisation’s requirements along 
the chain, backup provisions, etc. 
 In addition the CSP can via the UIs specify 
more than one service, i.e. different degrees 
of assurance and indicate that there will be 
additional charges related to them. The tool does 
not attempt to capture exact prices. These pricing 
details can be revealed later in the negotiations 
with the customer. However the tool allows the 
customer to clearly see what the different security 
and privacy choices are that a particular vendor 
makes available for their situation. 
2.5 Enforcing Uniformity
 In order for the decision support system (DSS) 
to be truly useful for comparing different CSPs 
it needs to enforce uniformity and consistency in 
the information provided by the various CSPs. 
Given that the customer defines the question set 
at least partially, there is an opportunity for the 
CSP completing the questionnaire to enter in 
data which may be subject to misinterpretation. 
The DSS deals with this by asking very detailed 
questions to lead to a detailed and less ambiguous 
assessment. Instead of asking for example if the 
CSP follows good security or privacy practices 
for a given domain the tool will ask a number 
of specific questions. For example if the CSP is 
assisting the customer in conducting an email 
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marketing campaign, a number of pointed 
questions will be asked, such as 
• “Will the subject line of the email be non-
misleading?”,
• “Will each email have an unsubscribe link?” 
• “Will unsubscribe requests be honored within 
10 working days (5 days within Australia or 
New Zealand)?” 
 etc rather than relying exclusively on general 
(and thereby  potentially ambiguous) questions 
such as 
• “Do you follow all the applicable privacy 
legislations w.r.t. email marketing?” 
 Another mechanism we have implemented in 
the tool is rule-driven help that can be associated 
with each question. The help information can 
thus be made specific to the context the customer 
has specified and contain specific examples and 
guidance how questions should be answered. 
 Being able to drill down to such a level of 
specificity is much easier doable with an 
automated tool then with paper documents. 
Where it seems useful standard cloud evaluation 
criteria as we will describe in Section 3.1 can 
be refined through further drill-down questions 
inquiring into details.  
3. KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION AND 
INFERENCE
In this section we provide more detail about the 
knowledge base, and the representation and inference 
mechanisms used.
3.1 Cloud Evaluation Criteria
 The system described in Section 2 generates 
information to support choices of cloud suppliers. 
To make reliable data collection possible within 
this process, it is highly preferable to use a clear 
set of evaluation criteria that are agreed across 
industry. There are currently several candidates 
for this: notably the ENISA standards [2] that 
are currently being refined and standardized, and 
alternatively the Shared Assessments tools [3]. It 
may also be possible to integrate the approach of 
Jericho Forum [4] when gathering the context: 
three scales are defined by which to measure 
types of clouds: whether it is internal or external; 
whether it is proprietary or open; and whether 
it has a security perimeter or not; these three 
scales can be arranged as three axes, creating a 
‘cloud cube’ in which clouds can be placed and 
classified.
3.2 Rule Representation
 The tool uses a set of intermediate variables 
(IMs) to encode meaningful information and to 
drive the questionnaire generation.  IMs can be 
thought of as flags, for example ‘transborder data 
flow’ (which indicates that the current context 
involves transborder data flow). For provability, 
we mandate monotonicity for the IMs, i.e. 
they cannot be retracted once they have been 
asserted.
 We define two kinds of rules: question (i.e. 
questionnaire generation) rules, and output  rules. 
All the rules have the general form 
 when condition then action
 Question rules have as their conditions a 
monotonic expression (i.e. Boolean expression 
built up using & and v as logical operators) in 
intermediate variables (IMs) and/or (question, 
answer) pairs and as actions, directives to ask the 
user some questions or else to set some IMs. The 
output rules’ condition is a Boolean expression 
in a set of IMs and answers to questions and they 
generate as their actions the content of the output 
report.
 Some of the output rules encode the customer’s 
policies; others encode regulatory privacy 
requirements. They represent trigger conditions 
based on Boolean combinations of parameters 
corresponding to properties relating to cloud 
service provision and output in the form of risk 
levels and other information,
 All the rules in the system are based upon 
the production rule system Drools [5]. Let us 
consider a simple example of the underlying 
representation, in DRL format (although the rules 
can automatically be converted to XML format). 
Assume that a CSP is answering a questionnaire, 
and that the question “Will data be stored in 
encrypted form?” is answered “Yes”. Assume 
this question has identifier number 48 in the 
system. This (question, answer) pair is added 
to working memory and as a consequence the 
following question rule is triggered asserting a 
new IM “Encrypted storage”:
 rule “IMR21” when QA (id == 48, value
 == “Yes”)            then insert(new 
IM(“Encrypted storage”,”Yes”)); end
 When the previous IM is asserted to the working 
memory it triggers the following question rule 
which adds new questions to the questionnaire:
 rule “QR17”
 when IM (name == “Enc”, value == “Yes”) 
then AddToDisplayList_DF(current, 
currentQuestion, new long[] {49});
 end
 Question 49 is “What encryption mechanism is 
being used?”. In other cases, blocks of questions 
are added to the questionnaire just by adding them 
to the set in the rule above. The questionnaire 
generation procedure then iterates through the 
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questionnaire. The initial (question, answer) pair 
will also generate a new parameter instance: 
“Encryption used in storage” with value “Yes”. If 
we require this to trigger an output, then this can 
be captured within a output rule. For the example 
above, when this parameter instance is added 
to the working memory of the privacy engine it 
triggers the following output rule:
 rule “Encrypted storage”
 when ParameterInstance ( name == 
“Encryption Used in storage” , value ==
 “Yes”  )                                          then
 report.addRule(new
 RuleFacade().findById(50));  end
 This rule adds a Rule object to the list of rules of 
the report. The rule can show a flag (to indicate 
the seriousness of the issue), a reason, a link to 
more information or other items to be included 
within the report to the customer e.g.
1. obligations that need to be passed on to other 
service providers; 
2. other information that needs to be provided 
to the company (potentially including 
evidence); 
3. restrictions about what that service provider 
should do; 
4. clauses that should be added into contracts or 
service level agreements (SLAs).
3.2.1 Example
 An example of a question that can be 
asked from the Shared Assessments 
guidelines [3] is: “Are the organisation’s 
employees and its Third Parties instructed 
to immediately notify the appropriate 
individual in the organization if or 
when target privacy data is, has been or 
is reasonably likely to have been lost, 
accessed by, used by or disclosed to 
unauthorized Third Parties?” This may be 
represented within our system in the same 
manner as described for the encryption 
question (question 48) above; similarly for 
the other questions in [3]. We can define 
question rules that link these questions, so 
that only those questions are asked that are 
relevant to the given context, and we can 
define output rules that link the answers to 
these questions to an expert’s assessment 
of the risk related to that answer, and more 
generally to a metric that contributes to 
the overall assessment of trustworthiness 
of the CSP that gives that answer (i.e. has 
that property).
3.3 Inference
 Our approach uses an inference engine to run 
rules in order to produce output. This approach 
is not reliant on any particular inference engine 
or specific format beyond processing of ‘if.. then’ 
rules, and so a variety of mechanisms could be 
used here, from production rule systems to Prolog. 
For our prototyping we have used the JBoss 
Drools rules engine [5]; this is run after each 
question is answered by the user and computes 
additional questions a user will be asked as well 
as the output reports provided by the system. 
4. USE CASE
In this section we describe the use case of a fictitious 
UK- based company “PeaceOfMind.com” (PoM) that sells 
meditation supplies (cushions, gongs, incense etc.) via an 
online store. PoM has recently been undergoing rapid growth, 
making it necessary to become more professional in the 
management of its vendors and suppliers, customer database 
and marketing efforts. PoM would ideally like not to host any 
applications for these services itself and wishes to evaluate 
cloud service providers as a cost-effective alternative. PoM 
does not have particular technical or outsourcing expertise in 
house and wishes to use the CSP Assessment tool described in 
this paper to decide whether it might use public cloud services 
and still be compliant. PoM, due to the nature of its business, 
also wishes to hold itself accountable to the highest privacy 
and ethical standards for the management of its customers’ 
data. 
PoM uses the tool to evaluate cloud services for managing 
its customer data base and for email and telemarketing. 
The tool first provides an interface to PoM where 
an authorized employee of PoM acting on behalf of PoM 
(henceforth this individual – or multiple individuals sharing 
this task – is just referred to as ‘PoM’) enters the types of 
information that would be included in such activities, which 
in this case would be name, address, email address, home and 
cell phone, as well as contact preferences for the individuals. 
PoM answers the next question about the countries of origin 
of the data subjects by clicking that it has data customers from 
several European countries, including UK, Spain, Germany 
and Denmark as it has subsidiaries in all these countries that 
have collected customer data. 
When asked about the business function being 
outsourced, POM selects customer relationship management 
and email marketing.      
When asked about security and privacy requirements, 
PoM selects “High”. PoM also specifies that it does not wish 
the CSP to make any secondary use of the customer data (e.g. 
data mining), that it requires backup services and disaster 
recovery mechanisms for its customer data, and that PoM 
wishes to be notified in case there are any privacy or security 
breaches. 
The tool takes this input and translates it into a online 
questionnaire to be filled out by the prospective CSPs. 
The tool presents each CSP with a description of the 
service the customer is looking for and that asks the CSP a 
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number of questions: for example which countries the CSP 
uses for processing, storage and backup for data and whether 
the CSP subcontracts some of the relevant operations.  
The high security and privacy requirements requested by 
PoM are translated into a variety of questions including which 
security certifications the vendor holds, whether it deploys 
encryption for data in transit and at rest, what type of identity 
and access management is used etc. In addition, questions about 
incident management procedures and secondary uses of data 
will be explicitly asked. For the email marketing aspect of this 
project, a number of detailed questions are asked to confirm 
that the CSP is in compliance with applicable regulations and 
generally applies best practice. 
In our example, two CSPs –  CSP 1 and CSP 2 – fill out 
the questionnaire. Both CSPs confirm that the data processing 
locations they use are within EU countries. The ‘transborder 
data flow’ risk indicator is therefore green, i..e. there are no 
significant risks in this domain. However, CSP2 – unlike CSP1 
– uses subcontractors for data backup services. This creates a 
yellow flag within the output report for CSP2, pointing out 
that the acceptability of the practices of the subcontractor need 
to be verified by PoM. A respective follow up item is created 
as part of a checklist. The security indicator for CSP1 is green 
as it turns out that CSP1 has a number of relevant security 
certifications and gives satisfactory answers to a number of 
security-related questions. CSP2’s security risk indicator 
is yellow due to the fact that the answers suggest possible 
weaknesses in its security procedures.
After reviewing these and other risk indicators, PoM 
decides that CSP1 fulfills its requirements much better than 
CSP2. Although CSP1 turns out to be more expensive than 
CSP2, PoM decides that CSP1 will the best provider to which 
to entrust its customer data.
5. RELATED WORK
A “Standardized Information Gathering” vendor security 
assessment questionnaire has been developed by BITS [3]. 
There is another vendor security review tool available at [6]. 
Relevant standards have already been discussed in Section 
3.1.
There has been some relevant related work on scanning 
cloud solutions networks, operating systems, and web 
applications and performing automated penetration testing 
[7]. This work may test for cloud performance or availability. 
These automated tests could complement and be integrated into 
the type of intelligent decision support we are suggesting. 
There has also been work in meta-scheduling for Grid 
applications: in particular, heuristics for scheduling parallel 
applications on Utility Grids that manage and optimize the 
trade-off between time and cost constraints [8]; a meta-
scheduler that maps user applications to suitable distributed 
resources using a Continuous Double Auction, using a 
valuation metric for a user’s applications and computational 
resources based on multi-criteria requirements of users and 
resource load [9]. However these systems are not suitable to 
address the compliance and policy issues we are concerned 
about in a comprehensive fashion.  
In our system (as with expert systems [10]), problem 
expertise is encoded in the data structures rather than the 
programs and the inference rules are authored by a domain 
expert. Most of those systems are far too complex to allow 
for provable completeness or predictability. By restricting the 
structure of conditions and actions in the rules we can prove 
completeness and predictability.   
There has also been some work on dynamic question 
generation in the expert system community [11] but their 
concerns and methods are very different from ours.
There has been extensive work carried out to define 
different types of security and privacy policy: such policy 
specification, modeling and verification tools include EPAL 
[12], OASIS XACML [13], W3C P3P [14] and Ponder [15]. 
These policies are formulated at a different level then the ones 
we are dealing with, as for example they deal with operational 
policies, access control constraints, etc. and cannot comfortably 
express context-specific privacy requirements for business 
processes such as marketing or software development. In 
circumstances where policies are specified by one party and 
enforced by another, the meaning must be agreed: this is 
achievable for example via standardization or via ontologies. 
There has been prior work to allow automated checking of 
user side policies with service side policies, e.g. via P3P [14] 
and Privacy and Identity Management in Europe (PRIME) 
project [16], but this is not directly translatable to the problem 
above.
Most importantly, these policies are not human 
understandable, which is what we need, even though they can 
be machine executed.  IBM and Sun have done some research 
on privacy policy management such as EPAL [12] and XACML 
[13] which are low level privacy policy languages and not well 
suited for human user understanding. In the Sparcle project, see 
e.g. [17], IBM Research built an editor to support transforming 
natural based policies into XML.  This makes it easier for non-
experts to input rules into the system, but the output format 
itself is not user friendly. The REALM project [18] from IBM 
Research suffers the same shortcomings. OASIS LegalXML 
[19] has worked on creation and management of contract 
documents and terms, but this converts legal documents into 
an XML format that is too verbose. Breaux and Antón [20] 
have also carried out some work on how to extract privacy 
rules and regulations from natural language text.  Their work 
has a different focus, but could be complementary for helping 
to populate the KB more easily. 
Translation of legislation/regulation to machine 
readable policies has proven very difficult, although there 
are some examples of how translations of principles into 
machine readable policies can be done: Privacy Incorporated 
Software Agent (PISA) project [21] (where privacy principles 
derived from [22] were modelled and used as a backbone 
in conversations between agents [23], P3P [14] (where user 
privacy preferences were matched against web site privacy 
statements) and PRIME [16] (involving the definition and 
usage of various types of user and service side privacy 
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policies).  However our research did not have to address the 
problem of interpreting and modelling arbitrary laws and 
adding them into our KB. 
Perhaps the most relevant prior work is a policy 
framework for global enforcement of data assurance controls 
that enables the expression of both service providers’ 
capabilities and customers’ requirements, and enforcement 
of the agreed-upon requirements in service providers’ 
environments [24]. This describes how the data owner can 
specify policies in terms of state machines that are placed in 
the metadata. These state machines are interpreted/executed 
by the service provider and allow specific policies provided by 
the data owner to be checked when dealing with the data. The 
data owner provides policies to the service provider along with 
the data, but the service provider is responsible for enforcing 
them, deciding how the high level requirements map down to 
technical controls and the data owner is not given assurance 
that the enforcement has taken place in a correct manner. 
The DSS does not actually carry out checks that the CSP 
policies are indeed accurate – it treats the assertions made 
at face value. To enhance our approach, this work could be 
integrated with other research that can provide a greater degree 
of assurance of such policies (for example, [16]), and with 
audit mechanisms and reputation management technologies. 
A method of automated trust negotiation within virtual 
computing environments has been proposed: this establishes 
a trust relationship between two strangers by exchanging their 
access control policies and credentials [25]. Our approach 
takes a much broader range of factors into consideration when 
calculating the trustworthiness of a CSP.
6. CURRENT STATUS
Our solution is based on decision support technology 
the authors developed that can provide privacy assessments 
in complex intra-company scenarios [26]. This ‘HP Privacy 
Advisor’ is a rule-driven system that is currently being rolled 
out to employees for privacy assessments and accountability 
within HP.
We are applying this system to the cloud environment. 
This includes generating different UIs and a KB for this new 
system based upon industry-wide recommendations as to 
properties of CSPs that should be checked (see Subsection 
3.1). From a knowledge representation perspective the cloud 
knowledge we wish to model in the KB does not appear more 
complex then the worldwide privacy knowledge we already 
have been able to successfully express. We are thus confident 
that our knowledge management capabilities can be used to 
express the cloud knowledge as well.   
6.1 Next steps
 Open issues that we will explore next include:
• Ongoing assessment of the cloud services that 
an organization is using. The DSS would not 
just provide an assessment at the beginning 
of the serive, but would provide its output 
reports, warnings, etc. on an ongoing basis, 
quickly adapting when new information 
comes in, such as that certain servers have 
become unreliable or insecure.
• Capturing additional relevant risks in the 
cloud space.
• Modelling dependencies among different 
CSPs; for example, if one provider goes 
down, which impact does this have?
• By modifying the ruleset one can run though 
‘what if’ scenarios about policy changes and 
evaluate their effects.
7. CONCLUSION
Cloud computing has the potential to reduce protections 
for personal data, and to compromise data security. This paper 
describes a system that aims to aid organizations in ensuring 
that their – and their customers’ – information will be treated 
appropriately before committing it to cloud service provision. 
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